A simple model to gain an assessment of current capabilities and help plan for future contingencies entails looking at the "stuff, staff, and space" needed to provide critical care. 3 All 3 areas are stretched already, and surging for a contingency requires due diligence to all 3. This paradigm simplifies the concept of surging capacity for an MCI.
Stuff. The ICUs are frequently strapped to provide necessary equipment for day-to-day operations. The sine qua non of critical care "stuff" is the mechanical ventilator. Most ICUs purchase or lease these to care for their usual patient needs. The number of available machines depends on the setting. Kaji and Rubinson 4 found that 71% of hospitals in Los Angeles had less than 6 ventilators available for emergency use. Ontario reports having 16 ventilators/100 000 population. 5 Challenges to surging these machines occur, in part, because vendors often have working supply relationships with multiple customers. Support from the Strategic National Stockpile can provide additional ventilators within 12 hours, providing states and transportation systems can deliver them to the affected facilities. However, it is important to note that in all of the planning for the delivery of emergency mass critical care with mechanical ventilation, no national support plans at present include the provision of medical gas, including oxygen. I n this issue of the Journal of Intensive Care Medicine, Mahoney, Biffl, and Cioffi outline an ambitious plan for intensive care units (ICUs) to prepare for mass casualty incidents (MCIs). 1 The journal's dedication of article space to this topic should be applauded, for modern health care systems with expanding critical care services have insufficient specialized staff, medical equipment, and ICU space to provide standard critical care for the influx of additional patients from a disaster. Therefore, disaster planning, which has typically been under the purview of emergency medicine or more recently, public health disciplines, must transcend into critical care medicine. Additionally, the recent severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) epidemic and the looming threat of an influenza pandemic have stimulated much recent debate about how to care for a surge of critically ill who overwhelm ICUs beyond that normally seen in suddenimpact disasters. Therefore, intensivists and the health care systems in which they operate must heed the advice provided in the accompanying article and elsewhere to best prepare for an inevitable surge in critical care requirements.
Although the accompanying article develops a methodology for developing a detailed disaster plan for ICUs, I think the planning process needs to consider Murphy's Law as perhaps an alternative strategy in many ways.
Staff. Staff support to ICUs remains challenging on a daily basis, let alone in a surge requirement. 6, 7 For example, Ontario has large number of physician, nurse, and respiratory therapy shortages. The result is often a diversion of emergency department admissions or even elective surgery cancellations because of a lack of operational or staffed beds. Disaster absenteeism may reach 0% to 60%, which may be especially true in a biological event. 8, 9 For outside support, contrary to that discussed in the article, disaster medical assistance teams neither have deployed nor are designed for provision of critical care. Discussion for "disaster critical care teams" has been entertained but not developed. Other regional assets that could be trained to support critical care staff include Metropolitan Medical Response System teams and Medical Reserve Corps assets. 10, 11 Volunteers, such as retired critical providers, could provide support provided appropriate pre-event identification, training, and credentials verification occurred. Finally, although most ICU staffing challenges focus on direct care providers, many others are instrumental to deliver quality critical care. These support staff include patient records personnel, computer support technicians, housekeepers, linen providers, and even community members to support providers such as dog sitters and child support. Hospitals probably should plan to provide on-site support to families (and pets) of caregivers to ensure they report to work.
Space. Space challenges round out the ICU support model for current assessment and emergency planning needs. As described, ICUs presently find itself short of critical care space and thus provide further disaster-planning challenges to provide appropriate critical care. 12 As a specific example, INOVA health care system in Northern Virginia has 189 beds with ventilators for a 4-hospital, 1500-bed health care system. 13 Expanding that space requires forethought. One plan highlights the concept of canceling elective admissions, expanding space capable of providing critical care (eg, postanesthesia care units), and "off-loading" health care facilities with stable patients to community care centers in essence making hospitals largely critical care facilities. 14
The Simple Things Are Very Hard
The generic problem is that it is hard for health care systems, which currently operate on narrow margins of viability, to invest in excess capability. Purchasing, storing, maintaining, rotating, replenishing, repairing, retraining, or repurposing health care assets for a high threat, but low-probability MCI becomes an endeavor too expensive to justify. And for the medical planners and administrators who struggle to keep up with their day jobs, "people are unlikely to give priority attention to an unlikely future disaster when there are 15 tasks to be accomplished by Friday." 15
No Plan Survives the First Contact Intact
As in combat, where no plan survives first contact with the enemy, disasters normally change rapidly. Clearly, a catastrophic event, in which the facility itself is compromised, changes the organization's ability to provide care. Similarly, if one of the scenarios developed in the hazard vulnerability analysis results in overwhelming numbers of severely injured or ill victims, the provision of usual critical care may rapidly change or halt. Ironically, the most likely scenario is that you get bogged down with the minimally injured or "worried well" victims who may overwhelm the health care system but minimally affect the provision of critical care. Several recent examples are worth reviewing.
In 1995, at the sarin gas release in Tokyo, 640 patients rapidly presented to St Luke's hospital, the closest major medical center. The emergency department was alerted 20 minutes after the event, and the first patients arrived at 33 minutes; the first ambulance came at 48 minutes. As in most disasters such as this, most victims did not arrive by medical vehicles (67%), a fact rarely rehearsed in most disaster exercises. For the ICU, the overwhelming majority of those who presented (83%) were discharged from the hospital; only 4 patients were considered severe and 107 moderate. Of 640 patients who presented, 4 required mechanical ventilation. 16 Similar epidemiologic patterns happen with bombings and explosions. In the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing, as in Tokyo, most victims sought care at the closest medical facility on their own, not waiting for ambulances or medical vehicles. As a result, less serious patients arrived earlier than critically ill who were seriously injured. Virtually, all victims had presented or been extricated within 3 hours. Of the 759 dead or injured, 509 were treated and were released with only 83 hospitalized. 17, 18 As in Oklahoma City, most blast scenarios (the World Trade Center as an exception) usually have played out within 3 hours.
The events are often divided into 4 distinct phases: chaotic phase, 15 to 25 minutes; reorganization phase, 60 minutes; site-clearing phase, 100 to 180 minutes; and late phase to complete rescue operations, 24 to 48 hours. 19 The accompanying article focuses mainly on the ideal plan for sudden-impact disasters such as these, usually with large number of victims who quickly present with traumatic injuries. In short, for ICU planners, the majority of patients who survive these events to receive hospital care do not have critical or life-threatening injuries, and most have presented within a few hours. Those who are critically ill, the prolonged ICU care they receive often results from the complications of critical illness, such as acute respiratory distress syndrome. 5 However, that paradigm changed in more prolonged-impact events such as occurred with SARS and will likely continue in similar events such as H5N1 avian or other pandemic flu where 25% to 50% of a community could become ill within several weeks. 20
Perfect Plans Aren't
It is not sufficient to have a written plan as the final product of a disaster-planning effort. It requires more than just an administrative effort-it is about getting a defined group of attentive, dedicated, and multidisciplined people and personalities working together within a defined operational structure for a decisive leader. And finally, because MCI delineates the people aspect of disasters as it applies to the provision of care, how that changes within the scope of a disaster needs a framework to function fairly and ethically.
Planning is a multifaceted task that perpetuates through all phases: prevention, preparation, response, and recovery. Too often, organizations focus on developing a written plan for their staff or facility inspections. This "paper-plan syndrome" not only leads to a false sense of accomplishment but also tends to result in a failure to revise, rehearse, and reinvigorate existing plans. 21 A common mistake clinicians and other health care providers often make is believing that planning is mostly an administrative function. Although it is true most providers are not expert planners, their direct engagement in the planning process is vital not only to develop successful contingency plans but also to optimize direct patient care and outcome. Failure of hospital administrators fails to recognize that imperative. Community planners, law enforcement agencies, fire and emergency personnel, public health officials, and others all have invaluable expertise and at times, critical intelligence regarding a possible event that may directly affect the provision of critical care in a facility or a region. These planners will not think to involve, or frankly, even to trust medical leaders if they do not show up for the planning or training events. It is through interactions with these players, with the exchange of business cards, where personal relationships develop, which have been shown to improve crisis communication, support, and trust (J.G., unpublished data, 2001). Understanding these associations and where to seek help on a local, regional, or even on a federal level then is imperative to (a) planning for a disaster, (b) asking for outside help, and (c) providing appropriate care. 22 Contrary to what occurs in many medical organizations, disaster response requires strong, effective leadership, not management. The decision-making cycle, the rapidity of changing events, and the often lacking amount of definite details require decisive action. Waiting for approval at time when communication resources are limited, seeking detailed information for certainty, or gaining consensus of opinion is a luxury of time often not available. Disaster decision making is neither a debate nor a democracy.
Finally, a unique aspect of providing medical care in an MCI, as nicely elucidated in the article, is the probable requirement to triage care. Although many tools exist for prehospital trauma triage such as Simple Triage And Rapid Treatment, a few are proven effective in all scenarios. 23 Even fewer are available for a pandemic flu setting; although several have been described, none have been fully tested. 24, 25 As the authors discussed, triage is a necessary critical care response tool in MCIs; as in many challenges, however, the "devil is in the details" in implementing those tools. For example, who will do the triage, what tools will they use to determine who is "severe but salvageable," when will it be used (locally or regionally), who will cover future liability concerns, how will this affect where patients seek care? The authors are correct in raising the need for a discussion in this significant political, legal, and ethical issue.
Summary
The ICU disaster preparedness and emergency mass critical care is slowly becoming recognized as a deficiency in our nation's health care preparedness. Mahoney, Biffl, and Cioffi should be commended for their significant contribution to this awareness and dialogue. Although detailed analysis with dedicated resources is vital to successful ICU MCI preparedness, the process needs to remain simple-know the threat, meet the players, develop and understand the disaster organization, and rehearse. It is not the plan per se that results, it is the planning process, the contacts that are made, and the training that ensues that will optimize chances for a successful response. Given those preparations, the heroes who respond will develop a new path for success.
